

Unawareness and Impossible States

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cognitive idealizations

- ▶ two main families of doxastic models:
 - (i) **epistemic logic** for *full beliefs*
 - (ii) **probability** for *partial beliefs*
- ▶ *both* doxastic models suffer from two main cognitive idealizations:
 - (i) **logical omniscience**: closure under logical consequence, substitutability of logically equivalent formulas, etc.
 - (ii) **full awareness**: full understanding of the state space
- ▶ to weaken these cognitive idealizations is intrinsically valuable *and* crucial for the development of bounded rationality in decision theory and game theory

a plea for impossible states

- ▶ lots of papers on each of the two cognitive idealizations:
 - Hintikka 1975, Fagin & Halpern 1988, Wansing 1991, Stalnaker 1991 & 1999, FHMV 1995 on logical omniscience
 - Fagin & Halpern 1988, Modica & Rustichini (MR) 1994, Dekel, Lipman & Rustichini 1998, Modica & Rustichini 1999, Halpern 2001, Heifetz, Meier & Schipper (HMS) 2006, HMS 2007a, HMS 2007b on unawareness
- ▶ **broad aim:** defend the impossible states (or worlds) approach as a unifying way to weaken cognitive idealizations = **a plea for impossible states**

impossible states and LO

- (i) what is a “unifying” solution ?
 - (1) a solution to both logical omniscience and unawareness
 - (2) a solution for models of *full and partial* beliefs

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 - (2) a solution for models of *full and partial* beliefs
- (ii) what are impossible states? states of the state space where *a priori* “anything goes”
 - ▶ it is well-known that impossible states allow one to introduce any form of logical ignorance in epistemic logic
 - ▶ **basic idea:** suppose that Pierre believes that ϕ but not that ψ where ψ is a logical consequence of ϕ . Modeling: Pierre considers as epistemically possible a state s^* where ϕ is true but ψ is false. By assumption, s^* is an impossible state.
 - ▶ Cozic (2007) shows how to extend the impossible state solution to probabilistic logic (logical version of *type*

what is (un)awareness ?

- ▶ *Modica & Rustichini 1999:*
 - “ignorance about the state space”
 - “some of the facts that determine which state of nature occurs are not present in the subject’s mind”
 - “the agent does not know, does not know that she does not know, does not know that she does not know that she does not know, and so on...”
- ▶ *Heifetz, Meier & Schipper 2007b:*
 - “Unawareness refers to lack of conception rather than to lack of information.”

example

- ▶ Pierre plans to rent a house for the holiday; three main factors from the modeler point of view:
 - p : the house is no more than 1 km far from the sea
 - q : the house is no more than 1 km far from a bar
 - r : the house is no more than 1 km far from an airport

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 - r : the house is no more than 1 km far from an airport
- ▶ “simple”, factual, ignorance of r : Pierre doesn't know whether there is an airport no more than 1 km far from the house - there are both r -states and $\neg r$ -states which are epistemically accessible

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 - r : the house is no more than 1 km far from an airport
- ▶ “simple”, factual, ignorance of r : Pierre doesn't know whether there is an airport no more than 1 km far from the house - there are both r -states and $\neg r$ -states which are epistemically accessible
- ▶ unawareness: Pierre doesn't ask to himself: “is there an airport no more than 1 km far from the house?”
[See states in *small worlds* in Savage (1954/72)]

example, *cont.*

- ▶ the possibility that r is not simply excluded: it is out of Pierre's state space
- ▶ modeler's point of view:

pqr	$p\neg qr$	$pq\neg r$	$p\neg q\neg r$
$\neg pqr$	$\neg p\neg qr$	$\neg pq\neg r$	$\neg p\neg q\neg r$

- ▶ Pierre's point of view:

pq	$p\neg q$
$\neg pq$	$\neg p\neg q$

[See Savage: "...a smaller world is derived from a larger by neglecting some distinctions between states"]

properties of (un)awareness

- ▶ some intuitive properties of (un)awareness:

$A\phi \leftrightarrow A\neg\phi$	(Symmetry)
$A(\phi \wedge \psi) \leftrightarrow A\phi \wedge A\psi$	
$A\phi \leftrightarrow AA\phi$	(Self-Reflection)
$U\phi \rightarrow UU\phi$	(U-introspection)
$U\phi \rightarrow \neg B\phi \wedge \neg B\neg B\phi$	(Plausibility)
$U\phi \rightarrow (\neg B)\phi^n \forall n \in \mathbb{N}$	(Strong Plausibility)
$\neg BU\phi$	(BU-introspection)

the modeling of (un)awareness

- ▶ it is impossible to devise a non-trivial (un)awareness operator that satisfies most of the intuitively appealing properties above mentioned
- ▶ for instance, in “*Standard State-Space Models Preclude Unawareness*” (1998) , Dekel, Lipman & Rustichini show that it is impossible to have
 - (i) a non-trivial awareness operator which satisfies Plausibility, U-introspection and BU-introspection
 - (ii) a belief operator which satisfies either Necessitation or Monotonicity

main models of unawareness

- ▶ two main ways to circumvent the issue:
- (i) **endogenous** characterization: awareness defined in terms of beliefs : Modica & Rustichini (1999), Heifetz, Meier & Schipper (2006), (2007a)

$$\mathcal{M}, s \models A\phi \Leftrightarrow \mathcal{M}, s \models B\phi \vee B\neg B\phi$$

main models of unawareness

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- (ii) **exogenous** characterization: Fagin & Halpern (1988), Halpern (2001) awareness[©] structures

$$\mathcal{M}, s \models A\phi \Leftrightarrow \phi \in \mathcal{A}(s)$$

where $\mathcal{A} : S \rightarrow \wp(\mathcal{L}(At))$

GSM structures, example

- ▶ state space S based on $At = \{p, q, r\}$:

pqr	$p\neg qr$	$pq\neg r$	$p\neg q\neg r$
$\neg pqr$	$\neg p\neg qr$	$\neg pq\neg r$	$\neg p\neg q\neg r$

- ▶ in actual state $s = pqr$, Pierre believes that p , does not know whether q and is unaware of r ; his non-standard state space $S_{p,q}$ and accessibility correspondance in s are

pq	$p\neg q$
$\neg pq$	$\neg p\neg q$

GSM structures, example

pqr	$p\neg qr$	$pq\neg r$	$p\neg q\neg r$
$\neg pqr$	$\neg p\neg qr$	$\neg pq\neg r$	$\neg p\neg q\neg r$

pq	$p\neg q$
$\neg pq$	$\neg p\neg q$

- ▶ conditions:
 - pqr is projected in pq : $\rho(pqr) = pq$
 - if pqr and $pq\neg r$ are projected in pq , pqr and $pq\neg r$ agree on p and q
 - if pqr and $pq\neg r$ are projected in pq , $R(pqr) = R(pq\neg r)$
 - $R(pqr) \subseteq S_{pq}$

GSM structures

A GSM structure is a t-uple $\mathcal{M} = (S, S', \pi, R, \rho)$

- (i) S is a state space
- (ii) $S' = \bigcup_{X \subseteq At} S'_X$ (where S'_X are disjoint) is a (non-standard) state space
- (iii) $\pi : At \times S \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is a valuation for S
- (iv) $R : S \rightarrow \wp(S')$ is an accessibility correspondence
- (v) $\rho : S \rightarrow S'$ is a projection s.t. (1) if $\rho(s) = \rho(t) \in S'_X$, then (a) for each atomic formula $p \in X$, $\pi(s, p) = \pi(t, p)$ and (b) $R(s) = R(t)$ and (2) if $\rho(s) \in S'_X$, then $R(s) \subseteq S'_X$
 - ▶ each state s is associated to a subjective state space S'_X
 - ▶ one can extend R and π to the whole state space with π^* : if $s' \in S'_X$, then $\pi^*(s', p) = 1$ iff (a) $p \in X$ and (b) for all $s \in \rho^{-1}(s')$, $\pi(s, p) = 1$.

satisfaction relation

- ▶ one may then define as follows the satisfaction relation for each $s^* \in S^* = S \cup S'$ (Halpern's 2001 version):
 - (i) $\mathcal{M}, s^* \models p$ iff $\pi^*(s^*, p) = 1$
 - (ii) $\mathcal{M}, s^* \models \phi \wedge \psi$ iff $\mathcal{M}, s^* \models \phi$ and $\mathcal{M}, s^* \models \psi$

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 - (iii) $\mathcal{M}, s^* \models \neg\phi$ iff $\mathcal{M}, s^* \not\models \phi$ and either $s^* \in \mathcal{S}$, or $s^* \in \mathcal{S}'_X$ and $\phi \in \mathcal{L}(X)$

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 - (iv) $\mathcal{M}, s^* \models B\phi$ iff for each $t^* \in R^*(s^*)$, $\mathcal{M}, t^* \models \phi$
- ▶ crucial point: (iii) introduces **partiality**: if $p \notin X$ and $s^* \in \mathcal{S}'_X$ then neither $\mathcal{M}, s^* \models p$ nor $\mathcal{M}, s^* \models \neg p$ (for short, $\mathcal{M}, s^* \uparrow p$). More generally,

$$\mathcal{M}, s^* \downarrow \phi \text{ for } s^* \in \mathcal{S}'_X \text{ iff } \phi \in \mathcal{L}(X)$$

what (un)awareness is not

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- ▶ MR 1999 and HMS 2006 define unawareness in terms of beliefs; this is OK *given their assumption that accessibility correspondences are partitional*
- ▶ **but** this endogenous characterization is not robust under change of the accessibility relation's properties. In the general case,
 - it is plausible that if Pierre is unaware of ϕ , he doesn't believe that ϕ nor believe that he doesn't believe that ϕ
($U\phi \rightarrow (\neg B\phi \wedge \neg B\neg B\phi)$)
 - it is not plausible that if Pierre doesn't believe that ϕ nor believe that he doesn't believe that ϕ , he is necessarily unaware of ϕ ($(\neg B\phi \wedge \neg B\neg B\phi) \rightarrow U\phi$)

example

- ▶ the actual state s is projected in $s_1 \in S'_{\{p,q\}}$
- ▶ $R(s_1) = \{s_2, s_3\}$ (hence $s_2, s_3 \in S'_{\{p,q\}}$ as well) ;
 $R(s_2) = \{s_2\}$; $R(s_3) = \{s_3\}$
- ▶ $\mathcal{M}, s_2 \models \neg p$, hence $\mathcal{M}, s_2 \models \neg Bp \wedge B\neg p$
- ▶ $\mathcal{M}, s_3 \models p$, hence $\mathcal{M}, s_3 \models Bp$
- ▶ $\mathcal{M}, s \models \neg Bp \wedge \neg B\neg Bp$ hence $\mathcal{M}, s \models U^{MR}p$
But, for instance, $\mathcal{M}, s \models B(B\neg p \vee Bp)$

unawareness as partiality

- ▶ hence: keep the underlying GSM structure but change the definition of (un)awareness

unawareness as partiality

- ▶ hence: keep the underlying GSM structure but change the definition of (un)awareness
- ▶ the possible states that Pierre conceives do not “answer” to $?p$, $?q$ and $?r$: they answer only to $?p$ and $?q$
- ▶ unawareness may be seen as **partiality**: the possible states that Pierre conceives make true neither r nor $\neg r$

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- ▶ the possible states that Pierre conceives do not “answer” to $?p, ?q$ and $?r$: they answer only to $?p$ and $?q$
- ▶ unawareness may be seen as **partiality**: the possible states that Pierre conceives make true neither r nor $\neg r$
- ▶ semantic characterization of unawareness in terms of **partiality**:

$$\mathcal{M}, s \models A\phi \text{ iff } \exists t \in R(s), \mathcal{M}, t \not\models \phi$$

- ▶ Let's call a P-GSM structure a GSM structure where the truth conditions of the unawareness operator are given in terms of partiality

partiality and awareness[©]

- ▶ Halpern 2001 relates GSM structures and awareness[©] structures; one obtains a still closer connection with P-GSM
- ▶ an awareness[©] structure $\mathcal{M} = (S, R, \mathcal{A}, \pi)$ is *propositionally determined* (pd) if (1) for each state s , $\mathcal{A}(s)$ is generated by some atomic formulas $X \subseteq At$ i.e. $\mathcal{A}(s) = \mathcal{L}(X)$ and (2) if $t \in R(s)$, then $\mathcal{A}(s) = \mathcal{A}(t)$

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 - ▶ **Proposition** (see Halpern 2001 Thm 4.1)
1. For every pd awareness[©] structure \mathcal{M} there exists a P-GSM structure \mathcal{M}' based on the same state space S and the same valuation π s.t. for all formulas $\phi \in \mathcal{L}^{BA}(At)$ and each possible state s
- $$\mathcal{M}, s \models_{a^{\circledast}} \phi \text{ iff } \mathcal{M}', s \models_{P-GSM} \phi$$

partiality and awareness[©], *cont.*

2. For every P-GSM structure \mathcal{M} there exists a awareness[©] structure \mathcal{M}' based on the same state space S and the same valuation π s.t. for all formulas $\phi \in \mathcal{L}^{BA}(At)$ and each possible state s

$$\mathcal{M}, s \models_{P-GSM} \phi \text{ iff } \mathcal{M}', s \models_{a^{\circledast}} \phi$$

- **Corollary:** the axiom system K_X in Halpern 2001 is sound and complete for P-GSM structures.

axiom system K_X (Halpern 2001)

(PROP) Instances of propositional tautologies

(MP) From ϕ and $\phi \rightarrow \psi$ infer ψ

(A0) $B\phi \Rightarrow A\phi$

(K) $B\phi \wedge B(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow B\psi$

(Gen) From ϕ infer $A\phi \rightarrow B\phi$

(A1) $A\phi \leftrightarrow A\neg\phi$

(A2) $A(\phi \wedge \psi) \leftrightarrow (A\phi \wedge A\psi)$

(A3) $A\phi \leftrightarrow AA\phi$

(A4) $AB\phi \leftrightarrow A\phi$

(A5) $A\phi \rightarrow BA\phi$

(Irr) If no atomic formulas in ϕ appear in ψ , from $U\phi \rightarrow \psi$ infer ψ

probabilistic unawareness

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probabilistic unawareness

- ▶ as stressed by Cozic (2007) and Pucella & Halpern (2007), one of the main advantages of the impossible states framework is that it can be straightforwardly extended to the probabilistic case
- ▶ actually, P-GSM structures can be given probabilistic analogues
- ▶ sketch of the probabilistic extension: explicit probabilistic structures (EPS) are logical versions of type spaces from GT (see Aumann 1999, Heifetz & Mongin 2001) and true probabilistic analogues of Kripke structures

explicit probabilistic structures (EPS)

- ▶ **Definition** : the set $\mathcal{L}^L(At)$ of formulas of an explicit probabilistic language based on a set At of propositional variables is defined by :

$$\phi ::= p \mid \neg\phi \mid \phi \vee \psi \mid L_a\phi$$

where $p \in At$ and $a \in [0, 1] \subseteq \mathbb{Q}$.

$L_a\phi$ means intuitively that the agent believes at least to degree a that ϕ

explicit probabilistic structures (EPS), cont.

- ▶ **Definition** : an **explicit probabilistic structure** for $\mathcal{L}^L(At)$ is a 3-tuple $\mathcal{M} = (S, \pi, P)$ where $P : S \rightarrow \Delta(S)$ assigns to every state a probability distribution on the state space.
- ▶ Satisfaction condition for L_a :
 $\mathcal{M}, s \models L_a \phi \Leftrightarrow P(s)([[\phi]]) \geq a$

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- ▶ Satisfaction condition for L_a :
 $\mathcal{M}, s \models L_a \phi \Leftrightarrow P(s)([[\phi]]) \geq a$
- ▶ higher-order (partial) beliefs are induced in the same way that higher-order (full) beliefs are induced by the accessibility relation

probabilistic unawareness, first attempt

- **Definition** : an **P-GSM explicit probabilistic structure** for $\mathcal{L}^{LA}(At)$ is a t-tuple $\mathcal{M} = (S, S', \pi, P, \rho)$ where
- (i) S is a state space
 - (ii) $S' = \bigcup_{\phi \subseteq At} S'_\phi$ (where S'_ϕ are disjoint) is a state space
 - (iii) $\pi : At \times S \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is a valuation for S
 - (iv) $P : S \rightarrow \Delta(S')$
 - (v) $\rho : S \rightarrow S'$ is a projection s.t. (1) if $\rho(s) = \rho(t) \in S'_\phi$, then (a) for each atomic formula $p \in \Phi$, $\pi(s, p) = \pi(t, p)$ and (b) $P(s) = P(t)$ and (2) if $\rho(s) \in S'_\phi$, then $Supp(P(s)) \subseteq S'_\phi$

probabilistic unawareness, first attempt

- ▶ some good news:
for all GSM-EPS \mathcal{M} and all standard state s , unawareness precludes positive probability:
 $\mathcal{M}, s \models U\phi \rightarrow \neg L_a\phi$ for $a > 0$
 $\mathcal{M}, s \models U\phi \rightarrow \neg L_a\neg\phi$ for $a > 0$
 $\mathcal{M}, s \models \neg L_a U\phi$ for $a > 0$

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 $\mathcal{M}, s \models U\phi \rightarrow \neg L_a\neg\phi$ for $a > 0$
 $\mathcal{M}, s \models \neg L_a U\phi$ for $a > 0$
- ▶ but some (very) bad news:
for all GSM-EPS \mathcal{M} and all standard state s ,
 $\mathcal{M}, s \models U\phi \rightarrow L_0\phi$
 $\mathcal{M}, s \models U\phi \rightarrow L_0\neg\phi$
 $\mathcal{M}, s \models U\phi \rightarrow L_1L_0\phi$ (!!)

probabilistic unawareness, second attempt

- ▶ satisfaction condition for $L_a\phi$:
 $\mathcal{M}, \mathbf{s} \models L_a\phi \Leftrightarrow P(\mathbf{s})([[\phi]]) \geq a$ **and** $\mathcal{M}, \rho(\mathbf{s}) \Downarrow \phi$

probabilistic unawareness, second attempt

- ▶ satisfaction condition for $L_a\phi$:
 $\mathcal{M}, s \models L_a\phi \Leftrightarrow P(s)([[\phi]]) \geq a$ **and** $\mathcal{M}, \rho(s) \Downarrow \phi$
- ▶ in this case, the following holds:

$A\phi \leftrightarrow A\neg\phi$	(Symmetry)
$A\phi \leftrightarrow AA\phi$	(Self-Reflection)
$U\phi \rightarrow UU\phi$	(U-introspection)
$U\phi \rightarrow \neg L_a\phi \wedge \neg L_a\neg L_a\phi$	(Plausibility)
$U\phi \rightarrow (\neg L_a)^n\phi \forall n \in \mathbb{N}$	(Strong Plausibility)
$\neg L_a U\phi$	(L_a U-introspection)
$L_0\phi \leftrightarrow A\phi$	

further issues

- 1 axiomatizing probabilistic unawareness
- 2 becoming aware
- 3 multi-agent unawareness
- 4 applications to decision theory and game theory

axiomatizing probabilistic unawareness

- ▶ Heifetz & Mongin 2001 have axiomatized explicit probabilistic structures i.e. probabilistic structures with full awareness

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- ▶ Halpern 2001 has axiomatized pd awareness[©] structures hence P-GSM structures
- ▶ the next step is to axiomatize P-GSM probabilistic structures

becoming aware

- ▶ Pierre may be initially unaware of ϕ and become aware of ϕ :
 - (1) when someone gives Pierre an information that involves ϕ
 - (2) when someone asks Pierre what he thinks about ϕ

becoming aware

- ▶ Pierre may be initially unaware of ϕ and become aware of ϕ :
 - (1) when someone gives Pierre an information that involves ϕ
 - (2) when someone asks Pierre what he thinks about ϕ
- ▶ when one thinks about (1) for full beliefs, things may look simple:
 - initially, Pierre is only aware of p , neither q nor $\neg p$:
 $R(s) \subseteq S_p$
 - Pierre is informed that q
 - (i) first, the structure is modified such that $R'(s) \subseteq S_{p,q}$
 - (ii) then, the $\neg q$ -states are eliminated

becoming aware, cont.

- ▶ but *even for scenario of type (1)*, the probabilistic case is much more tricky
- ▶ one could reason like this:
 - initially, Pierre is only aware of p , neither q nor p :
 $Supp(P(s)) \subseteq S_p$
 - Pierre is informed that q
 - (i) first, the structure is modified: $Supp(P'(s)) \subseteq S_{p,q}$ and for each ϕ of $\mathcal{L}(\{p\})$, $P(s)([[\phi]]) = P'(s)([[\phi]])$
 - (ii) then, Pierre conditionalizes on the information that q
- ▶ but the new probability of p could be affected by the fact that the agent learns that q (intuitively, if p and q are not independent)